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ABSTRACT
The Basel Committee’s recent consultative document on the “Proposal to Ensure the Loss 
Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” sets out a proposal aimed at 
“enhancing  the  entry  criteria  of  regulatory  capital  to  ensure  that  all  regulatory  capital 
instruments issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses in the event that a bank is unable 
to support itself in the private market.”
As well as demonstrating its support of the Basel Committee’s statement that a public sector 
injection of capital should not protect investors from absorbing the loss that they would have 
incurred (had the public  sector not chosen to  rescue the bank),  this  paper also highlights 
identified  measures  which  have  been  put  forward  as  means  of  rescuing  failing  banks  – 
without  taxpayer  financing.  Furthermore,  it  highlights  why  the  controlled  winding  down 
procedure also constitutes a means whereby losses could still be absorbed in the event that a 
bank is unable to support itself in the private market.
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Compensation Schemes Directive; bail outs; equity; liquidity
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Introduction
Capital is very significant in its role since it serves to absorb risks and protect deposits. Given 
the imposition of an adequately stipulated minimum ratio, it could also facilitate the process 
of equalising competition between banks (rather than impeding their ability to compete).
The Basel Committee’s recent consultative document on the “Proposal to Ensure the Loss 
Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” sets out a proposal aimed at 
“enhancing  the  entry  criteria  of  regulatory  capital  to  ensure  that  all  regulatory  capital 
instruments issued by banks are capable of absorbing losses in the event that a bank is unable 
to support itself in the private market.”2
Of  particular  interest  are  the  Committee’s  observations  regarding  the  consequences  of 
rescuing several distressed banks during the recent Financial Crisis, through the injection of 
funds (by the public  sector)  in  the form of common equity and other  forms of Tier  One 
Capital. Two associated consequences are as follows:3
- Its effect of supporting not only depositors but also the investors in regulatory capital 
instruments – which consequently resulted in
- The inability of Tier Two capital instruments (mainly subordinated debt), and in some 
cases, non-common Tier One instruments, to absorb losses incurred by certain large 
internationally active banks that would have failed - had the public sector not provided 
support.
As a means of ensuring that instruments are accorded with the status of  “regulatory capital” 
and also dealt with accordingly, a pre condition was stipulated by the Committee – such pre 
condition being that “such instruments are capable of bearing a loss.”4
As well as the affirmation of its opinion that “a public sector injection of capital (needed to 
avoid the failure of a bank) should not protect investors in regulatory capital instruments from 
1Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen and Oxford Brookes University, Oxford 
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2 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the Loss 
Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 at page 1 (page 7 of 20) < 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.htm.>
3 See ibid
4 Of particular interest is the third option which was provided by the Committee as a means of ensuring this 
outcome (of ensuring that such instruments are capable of bearing a loss). This option is namely, the requirement 
that “all regulatory capital instruments include a mechanism in their terms and conditions that would ensure that 
they would accept a loss at the point of non viability.” See ibid.
absorbing the loss that they would have incurred if the public sector had not chosen to rescue 
the  bank”,  the  Basel  Committee  clearly  indicated  in  the  Consultative  Document  that  all 
regulatory capital instruments must be capable of absorbing a loss at least in gone concern 
situations.5 This requirement was prompted by the Basel Committee’s observations from the 
recent  Financial  Crisis  –  which  revealed  that  many regulatory  capital  instruments  do not 
always absorb losses in gone concern situations. In this respect it remarked that:6
“The numerous public sector injections of capital during the crisis, and other forms of public 
sector support have had the indirect consequence of ensuring that in many instances, capital 
instruments issued by banks that have been bailed out, have not taken any losses at all.”
Owing to huge liquidity problems, it was just recently announced that the ailing mortgage 
lender (Hypo Real Estate) is to be granted  € 40 billion to the already  € 102 billion in state 
guarantees. This (most recent) grant will also facilitate the launch of a “bad bank” whereby its 
toxic assets can be disposed of (aim being to strengthen the remaining core bank).7
The case of Hypo Real Estate  (HRE)8 is considered within this  respect,  not because it  is 
regarded as having not absorbed any losses (at  all),  but  rather,  because it  is  questionable 
whether the resulting burden imposed on taxpayers (arising from government funding), could 
have  been  mitigated  to  a  greater  extent.  Even  though  rescue  aid  was  granted  by  the 
Commission to Hypo Real Estate on the 2nd of October 2008 and further measures were also 
communicated by the German authorities on the 26th October 2009 (measures which included 
SOFFin guarantees of 8 and 10 billion Euros for HRE),9 HRE was eventually nationalised.10
5 The Basel Committee added that “if gone concern were to be defined as insolvency and liquidation, then all 
regulatory capital instruments would be loss absorbent on a gone concern basis and such loss absorbency would 
be  achieved  through  the  subordination  of  the  capital  instruments  –  with  the  result  that  any  repayment  in 
liquidation would only be  received  if  all  depositors  and  higher  ranked  creditors  are  first  repaid  in  full.”  It 
however defined „gone concern“ to include „situations in which the public sector provides support to distressed 
banks that would otherwise have failed. ibid at page 3
6 ibid at page 3
7See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “40 Milliarden Euro mehr Staatsgarantien”(Hypo Real Estate: 40 billion 
Euros Worth of More Government Guarantees) 11th September 2010 
<http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~EB16F2C756D694B4CA07FA5F
7EF8E7535~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> See also Bild, “Staats-Garantien für Hypo Real Estate: Wieso 
kriegt die Pleite-Bank noch einmal Milliarden?” 11th September 2010 
<http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/wirtschaft/2010/09/11/hypo-real-estate-wieso-kriegt/die-pleite-bank-
ploetzlich-noch-einmal-milliarden.html>
8 See  European  Commission,  “State  Aid  no  NN  44/2008  –  Germany  Rescue  aid  for  Hypo  Real  Estate” 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf
9 See  European  Commission  “European  Commission  State  aid  no  N  694/2009  –  Germany  Emergency 
Guarantees for Hypo Real Estate” paragraph 3
10 “In  January 2009, the German government  had promulgated  necessary measures  aimed at  facilitating the 
adoption  of  legislation  which  would  enable  it  acquire  a  majority  stake  holding  in 
Hypo.”<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5381WB20090409>  “The  squeeze  out  of  minority 
shareholders  – this being approved  by a court  in Munich in October  2009, paved the way for  the German 
government’s rescue fund SOFFin to get 100% of the real estate lender.” See Reuters; “Hypo Real Estate is 
Nationalised with Squeeze Out” <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD67573320091013>
B. How  Can  the  Desire  to  Facilitate  Gone  Concern  Loss  Absorbency  of  All 
Regulatory Capital Instruments (Including cases where there is public sector support) 
be Achieved?
“Conversion/Write offs” 
Whereby debt instruments  are transferred into “higher quality and common equity capital 
with better  loss absorption characteristics  – with the result  that  the institution’s  ability to 
withstand further losses is consolidated.”11
- Debt regarded as bank capital should be converted to stock or written off in a crisis – 
hence compelling bond investors to bear some of the cost of future bail outs.12
- All regulatory capital instruments sold by banks should be capable of absorbing losses 
if  the company is  unable  to  fund itself  – before taxpayers’  cash is  plundered into 
rescuing  a  lender,  so-called  contingent  capital  should  be  converted  into  equity  or 
written off.13
Controlled Winding Down Procedures
In the case which involved Bradford and Bingley,  the UK authorities decided to pursue a 
wind down  procedure whereby the retail deposit book was to be sold while an orderly wind 
down of the remainder of the business was to be undertaken for the purposes of maximising 
recoveries – as well as minimising the burden on tax payers.14
Reasons for undertaking the route of a controlled winding down process – as opposed to 
uncontrolled insolvency were also highlighted. An orderly winding down process would not 
only “maximise the value of the remaining assets and minimise the amount of necessary state 
aid”, but would also facilitate the repayment of the working capital facility as well as statutory 
debt.  Furthermore,  the  reasons  for  the  choice  of  a  controlled  winding  down  process 
necessitated  a  consideration  of  the  legislation  in  force  when  the  decision  to  wind  down 
Bradford and Bingley (and thereafter, Rumpco) was taken – and such reasons include:15
- An absence of a “strictly defined time-frame” for large and complex liquidations such 
as that of Bradford and Bingley (B & B).
- The fact that B & B would not have obtained the working capital facility which was 
required  in  order  to  pay  Rumpco  creditors  –  had  B  &  B  chosen  the  route  of 
uncontrolled  insolvency.  An  uncontrolled  insolvency  procedure  would  also  have 
resulted in a liquidation shortfall with respect to debt owed to creditors.
11 See  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  Consultative  Document  “Proposal  to  Ensure  the  Loss 
Absorbency of Regulatory Capital at the Point of Non Viability” August 2010 at page 13 (page 19 of 20) < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf?noframes=1>
12 “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts” 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-help-bear-
cost-of-bailouts.html>
13 ibid
14 See European Commission, “State Aid N194/2009 – United Kingdom : Liquidation Aid to Bradford and 
Bingley Plc” at paragraph 4 page 2
15ibid at paragraphs 13 and 14
- An uncontrolled insolvency procedure would have endangered the prospects of the 
recovery of full value of statutory debt.
- Rumpco’s  uncontrolled  insolvency would have undermined financial  stability  –  as 
well as market confidence.
C. Definition of Different Classes of Capital – should there be a re-definition of what 
constitutes  regulatory  capital  –  since  it  has  been  proposed  that  all  regulatory 
instruments should be convertible/capable of absorbing losses?
Capital is considered to comprise of elements of Tier One, Two and Three capital. Tier One 
Capital comprises common equity – which has the following attributes: 16
- It is considered to be the highest quality component of capital
- It is subordinated to all other elements of funding – absorbing losses as and when they 
occur, having full flexibility of dividend payments
- No maturity date
- It is the primary form of funding which helps to ensure that banks remain solvent.
The distinction between definitions of Tier One and Tier Two capital are highlighted by the 
Committee as corresponding to capital which absorbs losses on a going concern basis and 
capital which absorbs losses on a gone concern basis respectively.17
Proposed key changes, whilst aimed at “significantly improving the quality and consistency of 
the common equity of Tier One capital”,  as well  as simplifying Tier Two Capital  (to the 
extent that there would be only one set of entry criteria – and the removal of sub categories 
pertaining to Tier Two) also include the recommendation that Tier Three capital be abolished 
“to ensure that market risks are met with the same quality of capital as credit and operational 
risks.”18
As a result,  the proposed harmonised structure of capital  will  consist of Tier One Capital 
(going concern capital) with further components comprising common equity and additional 
going concern capital and; Tier Two Capital (gone concern capital).19
16 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” December 2009 at page 14
17 ibid
18 ibid at page 14-16
19 ibid at page 17
In proposing a new definition of capital, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in its 
Consultative  Document,20 elaborated  on  “certain  overarching  objectives”  which  had 
contributed towards its formulation of the proposed new definition of capital and these are as 
follows:
- a) Tier One Capital must help a bank to remain a going concern
- b) Regulatory adjustments must be applied to the appropriate component of capital
- c) Regulatory capital must be simple and harmonised across jurisdictions
- d) The components of regulatory capital must be clearly disclosed
The proposed new definition of capital offers several advantages – one of which is namely, 
the facilitation of harmonisation – since the regulatory definition of capital varies according to 
the jurisdiction and its governing law.21
D. Problems  and  Benefits  Identified  with  Basel  Committee’s  Loss  Absorbency 
Proposal
Some  problems  identified  with  the  Basel  Committee’s  proposal  -  that  all  regulatory 
instruments should be capable of absorbing losses include the following:
 
- the need for a liquid market (which is considered not to exist at present)
- A possible  rise in the banks’ cost  of capital  (since investors are likely to  demand 
compensation for the increased risk being borne – for which they will not be repaid.22 
- Lower levels of investment 
- Increased uncertainty and further  elevated levels  of instability  as a result  of  lower 
levels of investment
Even though the above-mentioned issues have been raised, the Basel Committee is clearly 
justified in its affirmation that “a public sector injection of capital (needed to avoid the failure 
of a bank) should not protect investors in regulatory capital instruments from absorbing the 
loss that they would have incurred if the public sector had not chosen to rescue the bank.”
Furthermore, most of these concerns are not entirely well-grounded since investment (in any 
case – and regardless of the recommendation that all regulatory capital instruments issued by 
banks are capable of absorbing losses on a going and gone concern basis) will always involve 
an element of risk. Banks should not be made to pay more money to investors for regulatory 
capital (if and when investors demand compensation for increased risk for which they will not 
be repaid) since investors get paid to take risks and should expect risks with investments. 
Perhaps some form of reward or loyalty payments could be tied in to the investments – such 
20 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” December 2009 at pages 14 and 15 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf>
21 The regulatory definition of capital is considered to be “inevitably embedded in company law”. See European 
Banking Federation, Comments on Consultative Documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
“Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 13
22 “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts” 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-help-bear-
cost-of-bailouts.html>
rewards being redeemed23 by investors only in the event that the bank or firm operates on a 
gone concern basis. Other schemes which serve to ensure that minimum safeguards are place 
to compensate investors, to insure investor protection - as well as encourage small investors to 
invest in securities, include the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive (the ICD)  24 and 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive.25 The ICD (which has been replaced by the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive – MiFID), “provides for clients receiving investment services 
from  investment  firms  (including  credit  institutions)  to  be  compensated  in  specific 
circumstances where the firm is unable to return money or financial instruments that it holds 
on the client’s behalf.”26
It  is  acknowledged that  the Committee’s  recommendations  should signal  to investors that 
higher risks are to be anticipated. Furthermore, bond holders (and not tax payers) should now 
expect to be the first resort (in terms of funding and new equity) where it is evident that an 
institution is likely to operate on a gone concern basis. This could result in slightly lower 
levels of investment – however, it could also produce the beneficial result of discouraging 
investment by those investors who take excessive risks – hence reducing moral hazard. A 
balance  should  be struck  between introducing  appropriate  incentives  (aimed  at  sustaining 
healthy levels of investment) which would encourage non reckless investors to invest and the 
need to discourage excessive levels of risk taking.
Based  on  the  Basel  Committee’s  efforts  to  improve  the  disclosure  requirements  of  the 
components  of  regulatory  capital,  greater  transparency  should  be  facilitated  –  such 
transparency contributing to less uncertainty and assisting investors in deciding whether or 
not to invest in certain products. Bank depositors have greater need of protection since more 
rules (range of conduct rules)27 exist within the investment sector - which serve the purpose of 
assisting investors in arriving at their investment decisions. In so far as the Basel Committee 
is able to achieve efforts aimed at mitigating substantial elements of uncertainty which may 
23 The European Banking Federation (EBF) made a proposal that instruments should not qualify (or be included) 
as  Tier  2  capital  if  there  would  be  incentives  to  redeem.  European  Banking  Federation,  Comments  on 
consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at 
page 13
24 The Directive 97/9/EC on Investor Compensation Schemes, known as the Investment Compensation Scheme 
Directive  (the  ICD),  was  adopted  in  1997 as  a  supplement  for  the Investment  Services  Directive  (Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field (OJ L 141,11.6.1993, p. 27–
46).
25 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee 
schemes [amended by Directive 2005/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2005 and 
Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 
94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay (Text with EEA 
relevance)]
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0019:EN:HTML
26 See Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
amending Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on investor compensation
schemes at page 2 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0371:FIN:EN:PDF>
27 As well  as  serving as  an “additional  layer  of  protection in  collaboration with conduct  of  business  rules, 
prudential regulation and operational safeguards, the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive (ICD) is also 
aimed at “protecting investors against the risk of losses in the event of an investment firm’s inability to repay 
money or return assets held on their behalf.” See DG Internal Market and Services, EVALUATION OF THE 
INVESTMENT  COMPENSATION  SCHEME  DIRECTIVE  DG  INTERNAL  MARKET  AND  SERVICES 
EXECUTIVE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS at page 2
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/docs/evaluation/inv-comp-schem-directive_en.pdf
exist – with respect to the implementation of new regulations, such efforts should eliminate 
the fears attributed to consequences of uncertainty – namely,  greater volatility in the bank 
bond market.
Benefits of the Basel Committee’s Proposals
- Discouraging excessive risk taking (since investors  will  not  be encouraged to  buy 
securities  under  the assumption  that  they will  avoid losses  in  the  event  of a  bank 
failure)
- It  would  reduce  the  need  for  government  bailouts  owing  to  the  requirement  that 
contingent capital be converted (to equity or written off) to fund rescues rather than 
taxpayers solely bearing the cost. Hence bond investors of a bank will serve as the first 
resort during the impending collapse of a bank.
E. Measures Identified by the AFME as Means of Rescuing Failing Banks Without 
Taxpayer Financing.
In  its  paper  “The Systemic  Safety Net:  Pulling  Failing  Firms  Back From the  Edge”,  the 
Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) shed some light on two mechanisms 
which are considered to be instrumental in the achievement of the goal of managing a failing 
financial institution – as well as the re capitalisation of such an institution (without the need 
for capital support from governments and tax payers).28 These mechanisms are:29
- 1) The Bail In Mechanism : Whose implementation commences when a firm reaches a 
pre-defined trigger – which would re-capitalise a firm as a going concern (through the 
conversion  of  selected  levels  of  unsecured  debt  to  common  equity).  Since  no 
shareholder  or  creditor  consultation  is  considered  to  be  necessary,  a  swift 
implementation of its operation is expected.
- 2) Contingent Capital: Whose implementation has been undertaken historically by the 
insurance sector and which serves as a provision for one-time losses. It is issued in the 
form of notes which are convertible into equity as soon as a pre-defined trigger is 
attained by the issuer.  Since it  requires no regulatory involvement,  transparency is 
enhanced  –  such  transparency serving  as  a  potential  means  in  helping  to  prevent 
localised problems from triggering into a full blown systemic crisis.”
One  difference  between  both  mechanisms  can  be  attributed  to  the  frequency  of  their 
applicability.  Whilst contingent capital serves as a provision for one-time losses which are 
unexpected,  the  bail  in  mechanism  operates  according  to  an  expected  pre-determined 
threshold level.
According  to  the  AFME, either  of  these  options  would serve as  a  better  alternative  than 
liquidation.30
28 Association for Financial Markets in Europe, “AFME Outlines Ways To Rescue Failing Banks Without Tax 
Payer Financing” http://www.afme.eu/AFME/Home/sifi%20pr.pdf at page 1 of 2
29 ibid
30 Furthermore,  the AFME adds that  with each option, the bank’s shareholders  would bear  the loss through 
devaluation or dilution of their equity and that (more critically), neither option requires capital support from tax 
payers or a pre capitalised fund for providing liquidity. See ibid.
F. Basel Committee’s Measures Aimed At Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital
Source: “Improving the Quality of Tier One Capital”31
„The enhanced Basel II framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the quantity 
of capital – as well as improving the quality of capital),and the macroprudential overlay are 
(together) referred to as Basel III. „32
31 See  H  Hannoun,  „Towards  a  Global  Financial  Stability  Framework“  Bank  for  International  Settlements 
Publications,  page  11  of  26  <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>see  also  page  9  of  26;ibid.  „With 
hindsight,  it  is acknowledged that  the global  banking system entered the crisis  with an insufficient  level  of 
capital and not enough high-quality capital. Recall that regulated financial institutions are required to hold Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets, with Tier 1 capital representing at least half this amount. 
Unfortunately the definition of what constituted capital included instruments or accounting items that could not 
absorb losses on a going-concern basis. Market participants knew this, and increasingly focused on the levels of 
tangible common equity in banks’ capital structures (after deduction of intangible assets such as goodwill). The 
levels of core Tier 1 equity proved to be too low.“ See page 10 of 26;ibid.
32Ibid at page 9 of 26
Conclusion
According to Laeven and Majnoni,33 regulatory capital, “should cope with the occurrence of 
unexpected losses – that is, losses that are large but infrequent and further, loan loss reserves 
should, instead ,cope with expected losses.” In reconciling the different views held about bank 
capital requirements, they propose a partitioning of regulatory capital which is based not only 
on terms relating to priority (as is the case for Tier One and Tier Two Capital), but also (and 
foremost) on risk management considerations.34 The management of “Too Big to Fail Firms” 
should  be  sent  appropriate  signals  –  signals  which  would  highlight  the  fact  that  the 
importance  of  such  firms  (to  systemic  stability)  does  not  provide  justification  for  the 
management  of such firms to act  recklessly.  Intensive restructuring,  to the extent  that  the 
entire management of such a firm is replaced (with new management) serves as an example of 
such a warning. This would also facilitate the reduction of moral hazard and excessive levels 
of risk taking. 
Distinguishing  between  Expected  and  Unexpected  Losses:  Regulatory  Capital  and 
Unexpected Losses v Loan Loss Reserves and Expected Losses
Should Tier  One Capital  alone  cover  potential  losses  –  particularly  in  view of  the Basel 
Committee’s  recent  recommendation  which  is  aimed  at  ensuring  that  all  regulatory 
instruments  absorb  losses?  Which  component  should  (have)  or  be  endowed  with  greater 
capacity to absorb expected or unexpected losses?35 
With  respect  to  the  current  debate  on  loss  loan  provisioning,  the  European  Banking 
Federation (EBF), the EBF is supportive of the provisioning based on Expected Loss model 
and  recommended  a  provisioning  model  based  on  the  EL  concept,  which  “captures  the 
economic reality of the lending activities of financial institutions in line with the six principles 
of  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements”  in  order  to  achieve  sound  Expected  Loss 
provisioning approach.36
33 See L Laeven and G Majnoni, „Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Slowdowns: Too Much, Too Late? at 
page 6
34 ibid
35 The preference for  total  regulatory capital  – owing to its  effectiveness  in capturing potential  losses,  was 
highlighted by the Federcasse – in reference to the proposal of a consideration of only Tier One capital to cover 
buffers. See  Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo Casse Rurali ed Artigiane,(Federcasse) 
Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Strengthening the 
Resilience of the Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring” 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/ifoccb.pdf at page 10
36 European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 6 
http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measu
rement_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf
Two principal reasons have been put forward by the European Banking Federation to justify 
their proposal of a sufficient level of non-predominant Tier One when limits to the capital 
components  are determined.37 These are attributed to “the quality of non-core instruments 
which  will  increase  significantly  compared  to  today’s  instruments;  and  the  fact  that 
institutions will need to increase their global own funds level to comply with the new rules. 
“38
Should the minimum capital ratio of 8% be revised?
For reasons associated with the desire to enhance the competitive ability of banks, an increase 
in the present capital ratio is not favoured.
Tier  Two capital  should be able  to  cover  losses  absorbed at  the  point  of  non viability  – 
however, restrictions should be imposed on such potential – in contrast to the case with Tier 
One capital. There should be less restrictions on the classes of debt like instruments which can 
be included under Tier One capital.
Furthermore, those shares which are to be redeemed (as incentives) in the event of the firm 
operating as a  gone concern (and which should also absorb losses – hence resulting in a 
reduction of their  values when and if they are redeemed) should be included as Tier One 
capital.  As  illustrated,  Basel  III  reforms  reflect  efforts  being  made  within  this  field  – 
particularly  with  respect  to  contingent  convertible  bonds  (which  are  currently  being 
reviewed).
37 European Banking Federation, Comments on consultative documents issued by Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking  Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 13 
http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measu
rement_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf
38 Other benefits attributed to the non-core Tier 1 instruments include its large investor base and the very useful 
currency diversification. For this reason, a request was put (by the European Banking Federation) to the 
Committee to set Core Tier 1 at a reasonable level - close to 51%.;ibid
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